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Liability of Parent Corporation
for Tort of Subsidiary
Richard H. Burgess*
M UCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN about liability of parent corporations
for acts of their subsidiaries, but much of the material
principally concludes that there is no clear law on the subject.
It has often been said that the legal concepts involved in this
determination are mere verbiage or metaphors used to label the
results of a purely equitable decision. Two of the classic state-
ments to this effect are those of Cardozo, J., in Berkey v. Third
Ave. Ry. Co.,'
The whole problem of the relation between parent and sub-
sidiary corporation is one that is still involved in the mists
of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be carefully watched,
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they often end
by enslaving it.
and of Justice Roberts, in the "Deep-Rock" case,
2
The so-called instrumentality rule is not, properly speaking,
a rule, but a convenient way of designating the application,
in particular circumstances, of the broader equitable princi-
ple that the doctrine of corporate entity, recognized gener-
ally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when so
to do would work fraud or injustice.
In an analysis of the cases up until that time, William 0.
Douglas, a Yale law professor who was to become a Supreme
Court Justice, analyzed the more modern view.3 He pointed out
that, while there were no hard and fast rules in this field, several
factors could be recognized which might be useful in the
analysis of any given case to reduce diverse facts to a small
number of "lower common denominators." Depending on the
presence or absence of various legal and equitable factors,
liability might or might not be found. The present article is an
attempt to illustrate several of the more recent cases defining
* B.S. in Nuclear Engineering, North Carolina State College, Senior at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58, 61, 50 A. L. R. 599, 604 (1926).
2 Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307, 322 (1939).
3 Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corpo-
rations, 39 Yale L. J. 193 (1929). See also, 4 Oleck, Modern Corporation
Law, c. 71 (1960).
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various lower common denominators useful in analysing corpo-
rate entity problems related to parent and subsidiary corpo-
rations.
General Principles
The ownership of stock in one corporation by another does
not destroy the former corporation's separate legal entity. The
stock owning corporation is generally not liable for the torts of
its subsidiary unless the separate corporate existence is a mere
sham or is an instrumentality for concealing the truth or per-
petrating fraud.4 The fact that parent and subsidiary have com-
mon or identical directors and officers does not make the parent
liable for the acts of its subsidiary. There must be actual
operating control by the parent or at least a fraudulent intent.
Douglas and Cataldo elaborate on four standards to be met
in order to keep the business units from being treated as assimi-
lated. These are:
1. A separate financial unit should be established for
each corporation, sufficiently financed to meet normal strains.
2. Business transactions and records of the two units
should be separately kept.
3. Formalities must be observed, so that it is always
possible to tell for which corporation a common director or
officer is acting.
4. To avoid estoppel, the two units should never be
represented as one.5
Even though it is reasonably certain that when these four
criteria are met there will be no imputed liability, there is no cer-
tainty as to corporate structures not meeting these standards.
It is in this remaining gray area that several writers have felt
that confusing and indefinite terminology was being used to
explain results which actually depended solely on fraud.
Judge Soper of the 4th Circuit broadly outlined the problem
in the case of Certain-teed Products Corp. v. Wallinger.6
It is obvious that the extent of stock ownership and potential
control possessed by the holding company is not the de-
4 Brown v. Standard Casket Manufacturing Company, 234 Ala. 512, 175
So. 358 (1937).
5 Douglas & Shanks, supra, n. 3; Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man
Companies and Subsidiary Corporation, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 473
(1953). And see Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 3.
6 89 F. 2d 427, 434 (4th Cir. 1937); see also references to Powell on Parent
& Subsidiary Corporations, c. 1 (1931); Latty on Subsidiaries & Affiliated
Corporations, 5, 41, 142, 143 (1936), and cases cited.
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termining factor when its liability for the acts and obli-
gations of the subsidiary are under consideration. Some-
thing more must be found-something of fraud, or illegality
or wrong-doing, productive of loss or injury, to the com-
plainant, to justify the Courts, as they are wont to say, in
disregarding the corporate entity of the subsidiary body;
and it is because of the vague boundaries of this added
essential element that it is well nigh impossible in the present
state of the law to enunciate a clear-cut rule.
This approach seems to be agreed to by Lattin & Jennings, Latty,
and Oleck.7
The courts have often attempted to limit or define such
terms as alter ego, agency, sham, instrumentality and adjunct.




Douglas cast the question as being whether the subsidiary
is an agent of the parent." But Learned Hand states, to the
contrary in the case of Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Cham-
plain Transp. Co.,9 that the question of actual agency seldom
arises in a parent-subsidiary tort problem. This is because agency
is a consensual relation, and is not usually found to exist so as
to bind a parent for its subsidiary's torts.
Generally, the cases on parent-subsidiary agency require
a close business relation between the two companies in addition
to the elements of fraud that proximately caused harm to the
plaintiff.10 It is essential to a holding of agency that the sub-
sidiary be performing acts for the parent if it is to be treated as
the act of the parent, and that it be doing so under the parent's
control."
7 Lattin & Jennings, Cases & Materials on Corporations, 115, 135-38 (3d
ed. 1959); Latty, op. cit. supra, n. 6 at 162; Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 3.
8 Douglas, supra, n. 3, at 210.
9 31 F. 2d 265 at 267 (2d Cir. 1929); see also Lowendahl v. Baltimore & 0.
RR Co., 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N. Y. S. 62 (1936), aff'd 272 N. Y. 360, 6
N. E. 2d 56.
10 Miller v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 189 F. Supp. 916 (S. D. W. Va. 1960);
Owl Fumigating Co. v. California Cyanide Co., 30 F. 2d 812, affg. 24 F.
2d 718 (3d Cir. 1929).
11 Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 5 N. J. 28, 73 A. 2d 905 (1950);
Mangan v. Terminal Transportation System, Inc., 157 Misc. 627, 284 N. Y. S.
183 (1935); Ross v. Penna. Ry. Co., 106 N. J. L. 536, 148 Atl. 741 (1930);
Owl Fumigating Co. v. California Cyanide Co., supca, n. 10.
Jan., 1963
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The Court in the case of Owl Fumigating Co. v. California
Cyanide Co. stated: 12
When . . . it is charged that a corporation is a mere agency
or department of another corporation, and it is used as an
instrumentality to perpetrate fraud, justify wrong, avoid
litigation or make it more difficult, or generally escape
liability for what are in substance its own acts, Courts will
put aside the screen and determine the truth and place
responsibility where it belongs.
Complicated fact situations are generally present in parent-
subsidiary tort situations, and the results depend on an inte-
gration of many significant facts. As an example of a relatively
simple fact situation, in the case of Miller v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.,13 a corporation owned all of the capital stock of a company
and many of the same persons were officers and directors in both
company and corporation. The corporation operated no physical
property and the corporation and company did not share the
same office space. Directors' meetings were not controlled by
or subject to approval of the corporation. Under the facts the
company was held not to be the agent of the corporation and the
corporation was not liable for alleged negligence of the company.
The Court emphasized an essential element in the finding of
liability of the parent through agency as follows:
The clue to what is necessary to disregard corporate entity
is . . . the element of fraud. That entity may be ignored,
whether in law or in equity, when the latter corporation is
organized to promote an unfair purpose. 14
Instrumentality
Instrumentality is a term which several Courts have at-
tempted to define in this context. It seems to be in much
greater favor than the agency concept of liability. The case of
Fisser v. International Bank,15 quoting from Lowendahl v. The
Baltimore & 0. RR. Co.,1" set out three elements which must
be proved in order to justify application of the instrumentality
rule in the absence of express agency, estoppel, or direct tort
by the parent. These elements are:
12 Owl Fumigating Co. v. California Cyanide Co., supra, n. 10 at 813.
13 Miller v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, n. 10.
14 Ibid.
15 282 F. 2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1960).
16 Supra, n. 9.
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1. Control of the subsidiary by the parent,
2. That control is used by the parent to commit fraud
or, worse, to perpetrate violation of statutory or other posi-
tive legal duties, or a dishonest and unjust act in contra-
vention of legal rights, and
3. That the control and breach of duty proximately cause
injury or the unjust loss complained of. 17
Eleven factors have been enumerated in Powell on Parent
and Subsidiary Corporations, Sections 5 and 6,1s which, if present
in a proper and sufficient combination, will call for application
of the instrumentality rule. Powell states that this rule has been
adopted in all jurisdictions and that the question is simply as
to when it should be applied. His eleven criteria were adopted
by the Court in Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Company,19
and have been repeatedly relied on by the Courts. One recent
case is that of Garrett v. Southern Ry. Company.2 0 That
case pointed out that there is an additional general requirement
of elements of fraud or wrongdoing on the part of the parent
corporation to the detriment of the subsidiary or third persons
in their relations with the subsidiary. The eleven criteria are
as follows:
1. The parent corporation owns all or most of the
capital stock of the subsidiary.
2. The parent and subsidiary corporations have common
directors or officers.
3. The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
4. The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital
stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation.
5. The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
6. The parent corporation pays the salaries and other
expenses or losses of the subsidiary.
7. The subsidiary has substantially no business except
with the parent corporation or no assets except those con-
veyed to it by the parent corporation.
8. In the papers of the parent corporation or in the
statements of its officers the subsidiary is described as a
department or division of the parent corporation, or its
business or financial responsibility is referred to as the
parent corporation's own.
17 Powell, op. cit, supra, n. 6. at 4-6.
18 Ibid.
19 Supra, n. 2.
20 173 F. Supp. 915 (E. D. Tenn. 1959).
Jan., 1963
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9. The parent corporation uses the property of the
subsidiary as its own.
10. The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not
act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take
their orders from the parent corporation in the latter's
interest.
11. The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary
are not observed.
2 1
When a sufficient number of these factors are present in
proper combination, and in the presence of some fraud or wrong-
doing and consequent injury to the plaintiff, the parent will be
held liable for the torts of the subsidiary.
Whether or not a parent uses its subsidiary as an instrumen-
tality has been held to be a jury question.22
Alter-Ego
The successor corporation in a merger has been held to be
the alter ego of the former corporations 23 where the successor
corporation expressly assumed all the liabilities of the first com-
pany as a condition of obtaining permission of the ICC to trans-
fer a highway bus franchise to the successor.
Sham or Adjunct
When a subsidiary is a mere sham or adjunct of its parent
its existence will be disregarded.24 These factors seem to apply
when the subsidiary is simply a paper corporation and it is
determined as fact that there was no good faith attempt to
create a corporation. One case in which this rule was applied
involved a subsidiary which leased all of its assets from the
parent and whose stockholders gave only demand notes for their
stock to the principal stockholder of the parent, on which notes
payment was never demanded. 25
21 Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co., 96 F. 2d 693, 704-705 (1938);
rev'd on other grounds, supra, n. 2.
22 Johannsen v. Mid Continent Petroleum Corp., 232 Iowa 805, 5 N. W. 2d
20 (1942).
23 Barnes v. Liebig, 146 Fla. 219, 1 So. 2d 247 (1941).
24 Sheridan v. Pan-American Refining Corp., 123 F. Supp. 81 (S. D. N. Y.
1954).
25 Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi and Baggage Co., 178 Okla. 15, 61
P. 2d 645 (1936).
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Interpretations
All of the above theories have in common certain essential
factors including elements of fraud and control.
Control
Any majority stockholder, whether corporate or not, has
some degree of control over his owned corporation; however, the
degree of control required to establish the parent's liability for
the acts of the subsidiary must be more than mere participation
in the affairs of the subsidiary in a normal and usual manner. 26
A sufficient amount of control for liability has been held to in-
clude dispositive and proprietary power over or in the property
of the subsidiary, 27 manipulation,28 undue domination or influence
resulting in an infringement upon the rights of the subservient
corporation for the benefit of the dominant one,29 and actual
operation of the subsidiary's properties with utter disregard
for its distinct corporate entity."0
In the case of Garden City v. Burden5 l the Court, in sus-
taining the jury finding that an irrigation company was the
alter ego of its parent, said:
Where the relationship between the parent and subsidiary
corporation is so intimate, parent's control over subsidiary
is so dominating, and business and assets of the two are so
commingled that recognition of distinct entity would result
in injustice to third persons, courts should look through the
legal fiction of separate entity and treat them as justice
requires.
Thus, this case shows that when operating control of the subsidi-
ary by its parent is so great as to result in injustice to third
persons, the corporate veil is likely to be pierced.
26 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Assoc.,
247 U. S. 490 (1917).
27 Madison Pictures, Inc. v. Chesapeake Industries Inc., 147 N. Y. S. 2d
50 (1955).
28 Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W. D. Ark.
1951).
29 Kentucky Electric Power Co. v. Norton Coal Mining Co., 93 F 2d 923
(6th Cir. 1938).
30 Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F. 2d 383 (2d Cir. 1928).
31 186 F. 2d 651 (10th Cir. 1951).
Jan., 1963
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Fraud
Fraud or intent to do wrong is generally an essential element
for piercing the corporate veil.
It has been held that undue domination and control are
insufficient to cause disregard of corporate entity unless the
plaintiff was defrauded thereby.32 The same case held that a
plaintiff is estopped to claim that the parent corporation used the
subsidiary as a mere instrumentality if, with knowledge of all
the facts at the time of the transaction with the subsidiary, he
accepted or approved the relation between the corporations.
33
Business Relations Between Parent and Subsidiary
The many varied reasons for organizing subsidiary corpo-
rations are outlined by Douglas34 and elsewhere. One of the
normal reasons is to enable the parent to effectively conduct a
particular type of business in another state when it might not be
able to do so directly. A parent corporation will generally not
be liable for the torts of its subsidiary simply because it formed
the subsidiary to do indirectly what it could not do directly.3
5
The New York courts have gone so far as to say, in the case of
a British parent and a New York subsidiary, that no matter
how completely the parent might dominate the subsidiary, and
even though the subsidiary is no more than an instrumentality
for carrying out the parent's business, and although the domi-
nant motive in organizing the subsidiary is avoidance of suits,
without more, the parent would not be held liable.36
A subsidiary formed solely to distribute the products of its
manufacturing company parent will be treated as a separate
entity if it is operated independently and without dictation from
the manufacturing company.37 Also, one subsidiary which is a
selling affiliate of the parent is not the agent of another sub-
sidiary which is a manufacturing affiliate of the same parent.38
32 In re Kalamazoo Building Co., 21 F. Supp. 852 (W. D. Mich. 1937).
33 Ibid.
34 Supra, n. 3.
35 Segall v. Food Fair Store, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 81 (E. D. Pa. 1960).
36 Hazeltine Corp. v. General Electric Co., 19 F. Supp. 898 (D. Md. 1937);
see also McDermott v. Oil Burner Sales Corp., 266 Ill. App. 115 (1932).
37 Fergus Motors, Inc. v. Standard Triumph Motors, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 780
(S. D. N. Y. 1955).
38 Ledlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Alabama, 238 Ala. 35, 189
So. 78 (1939).
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A theory of "enterprise entity" has been advanced by
Berle.39 This new theory has been used by the courts40 and dis-
cussed by Lattin & Jennings.41 According to Berle's analysis,
the entity that should be treated in parent-subsidiary liability
problems is the business or economic entity rather than the
artificial corporate structure. He quotes from a case:
Rather we have a principle of law, namely, that below the
corporate papers there is always an enterprise; that, prima
facie, the corporate papers, minute books and books of
account describe and indicate that enterprise; that it is al-
ways open to inquiry whether the enterprise-fact corre-
sponds to the corporate-fact.42
Conclusions
Although the metaphors of Cardozo do not constitute rigid-
ly applicable rules, they do establish helpful guidelines. The
later cases have considerably increased the usefulness of these
concepts. The tests for holding a parent corporation liable for
the torts of its subsidiaries, while not based solely on equity,
do have distinct foundations in equitable case law.
39 Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Col. L. Rev. 343 (1947).
40 Sisco-Hamilton Co. v. Lennon, 240 F. 2d 68, (7th Cir. 1957).
41 Lattin & Jennings, supra, n. 7, at 145.
42 Supra, n. 37, at 353; e.g.: Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois,
312 U. S. 510 (1941); Southern Pacific Ry. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483 (1918).
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